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AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN 
OPERATION TOMODACHI: HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER 





The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has engaged in many humanitarian efforts over 
the years, such as the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and the 2010 Haitian earthquake.  As 
military personnel are deployed around the globe, the DoD is in a good position to 
respond when called upon. The 2011 National Military Strategy focuses on maintaining a 
global presence to protect our national interest. The strategy further stressed the 
importance of force preparedness to support and respond to humanitarian crises. On 
March 11, 2011, this ability was tested when Japan was struck by a 9.0-magnitude quake 
followed by a subsequent tsunami. This project analyzes the U.S. naval response to the 
humanitarian crisis that resulted from the Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami as 
part of Operation Tomodachi.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ................................................1 
B.  ORGANIZATION OF REPORT ...................................................................1 
II.  BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................3 
A.  TSUNAMI AND EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS ..............................................3 
B.  ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE EARTHQUAKE, TSUNAMI, AND 
NUCLEAR INCIDENT ...................................................................................6 
C.  OPERATION TOMODACHI AND U.S.–JAPAN RELATIONS ...............7 
III.  METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................9 
A.  DATA COLLECTION ....................................................................................9 
1.  Disaster Traits ......................................................................................9 
2.  U.S. Naval HADR Response ................................................................9 
3.  USN and MSC Platform Capabilities ..............................................10 
IV.  EMPIRICAL DATA ..................................................................................................11 
A.  JAPANESE DISASTER TRAITS ................................................................11 
B.  U. S. NAVY HADR RESPONSE ..................................................................12 
1.  Force Construct ..................................................................................12 
2.  USN and MSC Vessel Response Time Line .....................................12 
C.  SPECIFIC PLATFORM HADR MISSION CAPABILITY ......................15 
1.  Capability Classification ...................................................................15 
V.  ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................21 
A.  RESPONSE TIMELINE ANALYSIS ..........................................................21 
B.  COMPOSITE MISSION CAPABILITY .....................................................22 
C.  DISASTER RESPONSE COMPARISON ...................................................25 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................29 
A.  RAPIDITY OF INITIAL RESPONSE ........................................................29 
B.  UNIQUE AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS ........................................29 
C.  FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................31 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................33 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Map of Earthquake Epicenter (From Maps of the World, 2012) .......................3 
Figure 2.  Map of Japan (From Lonely Planet, 2012) ........................................................6 
Figure 3.  Vessels on Station by Days After the Disaster ................................................21 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Death Toll by Prefecture (From Vervaeck & Daniell, 2011) ............................4 
Table 2.  Effects of Japanese Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, 2011 (From 
Vervaeck & Daniell, 2011) ..............................................................................11 
Table 3.  Time Line of Operation Tomodachi Response (From C7F, 2011; Japan 
Bases, 2011; Baxter, 2011;  Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) ...............................14 
Table 4.  Capability Classification (From Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) .........................15 
Table 5.  Mission Capability Parameter Definitions (From Greenfield & Ingram, 
2011) ................................................................................................................16 
Table 6.  USN Platform and Capability Comparison (From Greenfield & Ingram, 
2011) ................................................................................................................17 
Table 7.  MSC Platform and Capability Comparison (From Greenfield & Ingram, 
2011) ................................................................................................................18 
Table 8.  Mission Composite Capability Time Line: Operation Tomodachi (From 
Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) ............................................................................24 
Table 9.  Future Research Recommendations .................................................................31 
 
 xii




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
C7F  Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoS  Department of State 
HADR  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
JSDF  Japanese Self-Defense Force 
MSC  Military Sealift Command 
MST  U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
SAR  Search and Rescue 
USNUS Navy 
 xiv




First and foremost, we would like to thank our advisors, Dr. Aruna Apte and Dr. 
Keenan Yoho, who provided mentoring and guidance throughout this effort. Without 
them, this project would not exist. We also must thank all the commands who assisted in 
providing data and answering questions. Specifically, we wish to thank Captain Joe 
Naman and Lieutenant Commander Matthew Turpin of U.S. Pacific Command, Captain 
Re Bynum and Commander Dion English of Commander Pacific Fleet, Commander 
Rodney Blevins of Commander Seventh Fleet, Commander Jose Sanchez and Lieutenant 
Luke Hodges of NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center Yokosuka, and Commander Jason 
Bridges and Lieutenant Donna Smoak of DLA Troop Support Pacific.   
 
 xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this research is to explore the utilization of U.S. Navy (USN) and 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships in supporting Operation Tomadachi between 
March 11, 2011, and April 8, 2011.  Specific areas of analysis include U.S. Navy 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) response platform types and 
characteristics.  
Operation Tomodachi is not the first large-scale HADR effort in which the U.S. 
Navy has engaged. Naval resources and capabilities were tested as recently as one year 
prior when a large 7.0-magnitude quake caused widespread devastation to the small 
island nation of Haiti. In addition, the HADR efforts for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
and 2005 Hurricane Katrina also relied on U.S. naval support in major ways.  
Due to its capabilities, the U.S. Navy is often called to assist in disasters occurring 
in coastal regions when civilian response capability is overwhelmed in scale and scope. 
This project is intended to provide military and other disaster response planners with a 
tool to analyze the response pattern of USN and MSC vessels supporting Operation 
Tomodachi. The project provides a broad capability index with which to measure 
particular and cumulative mission area capabilities throughout the response and builds 
upon earlier work by Greenfield and Ingram (2011), who analyzed other U.S. naval 
responses to HADR events.  
B. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
 This report is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is the introduction and 
provides the purpose and research objective. In Chapter II, we provide background 
information regarding the March 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, the economic 
importance of Japan, and U.S.–Japan relations. Chapter III outlines the methodology for 
collecting and analyzing the empirical data. In Chapter IV, we compile the empirical 
data. In Chapter V and VI, we analyze the data collected, provide relevant conclusions, 
and make recommendations for further research.     
 2
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. TSUNAMI AND EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS 
Japan is a country of islands geographically located along the eastern, or Pacific, 
coast of Asia, commonly known as the volcanic zone in the Pacific Depth.  It is an 
archipelago of about 145,882 square miles, bordered on the north and east by the Pacific 
Ocean and on the west by the Sea of Japan. Japan’s total population is estimated at 
127.08 million people, with a growth rate of -0.278%.  Although the country is comprised 
of more than 3,000 islands, the four main islands are Hokkaido, Honshu (or the 
mainland), Shikoku, and Kyushu (Department of State [DoS], 2012). 
On March 11, 2011, at around 12:46 a.m. EST (2:46 p.m. Japan Standard Time), 
the country was hit by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami, now known 
as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.  The epicenter was located 80 miles east of 
Sendai, the capital of Miyagi Prefecture, and 231 miles northeast of Tokyo.                  
 
Figure 1.   Map of Earthquake Epicenter (From Maps of the World, 2012) 
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Although Japan is a country prone to higher-magnitude earthquakes, this 
earthquake was the largest in Japan’s recorded history and one of the deadliest in the 
world. Its death toll is estimated at 14,027 people, with 13,754 people missing. 
Furthermore, the disaster displaced over 136,000 people, destroyed over 4,500 buildings, 
and damaged 71 bridges, over 3,500 roads, and 26 railways. Table 1 is a snapshot of 
death toll by prefecture (Vervaeck & Daniell, 2011). 





Deaths Missing Total 
Injured 




Hokkaido Hokkaido 5,507,456 1    3  1021 
Aomori Aomori-ken 1,373,164 3  1  61  815 
Iwate Iwate-ken 1,330,530 4,047  3,822  165  44515 
Miyagi Miyagi-ken 2,347,975 8,505  7,884  3436  43588 
Akita Akita-ken 1,085,878     12  539 
Yamagata Yamagata-ken 1,168,789 2    29  1438 
Fukushima Fukushima-ken 2,028,752 1412  2,044  227  26273 
Tokyo Tokyo-to 13,161,751 7    90  942 
Ibaraki Ibaraki-ken 2,968,865 23  1  693  677 
Tochigi Tochigi-ken 2,007,014 4    135  901 
Gunma Gumma-ken 2,008,170 1    35  2928 
Saitama Saitama-ken 7,194,957     42  3581 
Chiba Chiba-ken 6,217,119 18  2  224  1257 
Kanagawa Kanagawa-ken 9,049,500 4    139  695 
Niigata Niigata-ken 2,374,922     3  4695 
Yamanashi Yamanashi-ken 862,772     2  840 
Shizuoka Shizuoka-ken 3,765,044     4  755 
Gifu Gifu-ken 2,081,147         
Mie Mie-ken 1,854,742     1    
Nagano Nagano-ken 2,152,736       909 
Miyakazi Miyazaki-ken 1,135,120         
Tokushima Tokushima-ken 785,873         
Kochi Kochi-ken 764,596     1    





As depicted in Table 1, the majority of the deaths occurred in Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima. The disproportionate casualty levels in these particular prefectures were not 
the result of the earthquake but the subsequent tsunami that inundated coastal areas 
surrounding the earthquake’s epicenter.  
In Miyako, the capital of Iwate Prefecture, the tsunami attained a maximum wave 
height of 125 ft, inundating various coastal areas. The same tsunami caused a dam failure 
in Fukushima, destroying approximately 1,800 homes and causing a majority of the 
casualties in that particular prefecture. In addition, the tsunami also caused the largest 
nuclear incident since Chernobyl when it severed the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power 
plant’s power grid connections, causing overheating. The flooding and earthquake 
damage in the surrounding areas hindered external assistance, leading to a nuclear 
meltdown (United States Geological Survey [USGS], 2011). 
The scale of the disaster may lead one to conclude that casualty and damage 
effects should have been significantly higher. However, over the last two decades, Japan 
made significant investments in nationwide disaster risk mitigation infrastructure. The 
country currently invests approximately 1.2% of its government’s budget on disaster 
mitigation—a rate far above that of other industrialized countries. These investments 
include a ductile, earthquake-resistant design for new structures and retrofitting older 
construction, not just in Tokyo but across the nation. This investment resulted in the 
majority of buildings withstanding the original 9.0-magnitude quake and its sustained 
aftershocks (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2011).  
In 2007, Japan also launched an advanced earthquake and tsunami warning 
system that triggers nationwide alerts via cell phone, radio, and television. This system 
was fully operational at the time of the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. 
Applicable alerts were expeditious, and the populace was well aware of where and when 
to relocate (CSIS, 2011).  
Japan’s mitigation planning scenarios were based on the 1896 Meiji Sanriku 
earthquake and tsunami. Although the events in Meiji Sanriku led to a large-scale 
disaster, forecasts based on this particular incident were not adequate for the tsunami 
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triggered by the March 2011 quake. Evacuation sites were engineered to a maximum 
height of three stories vice the five to six stories required. In addition, sea walls had a 
maximum height of 10 meters and only three meters in Sendai and were, therefore, 
insufficient to prevent large-scale loss of life given the size of the tsunami. In addition, 
early detection systems failed to calculate the complete length of the earthquake and 
underestimated the tsunami’s surge (CSIS, 2011).        
Disasters of the magnitude generated by the 2010 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 
often necessitate quick, large-scale coordinated responses. To assist in relief efforts, the 
U.S. Navy sent 24 ships, including a Carrier Strike Group and an Amphibious Ready 
Group, to the affected region around northern Japan.  
B. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE EARTHQUAKE, TSUNAMI, AND 
NUCLEAR INCIDENT 
Japan is one of the largest economies in Asia and the third largest in the world, 
with a 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) of $5.391 trillion/$34,200 per capita. The 
country is highly industrialized and extremely competitive in areas linked to international 
trade, with the exception of agriculture, natural resources, and services. Its society is 
highly urbanized, with only approximately 4% engaged in agriculture (Department of 
State, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Japan (From Lonely Planet, 2012) 
The Tohoku earthquake resulted in over $200 billion in economic damage and 
disruptions to the global production chain because Japan is a vital source for most of the 
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world’s advanced technology products. The earthquake also exacerbated challenges that 
the Japanese economy was already facing, including an aging population, deflation, and a 
large-scale national debt to GDP ratio. Japan’s national government faces the difficult 
challenge of combating these demographic and structural economic challenges with the 
need for increased infrastructure spending required as part of disaster recovery (CSIS, 
2011). 
Japan is a major supplier for components in the automotive, electronics, and semi-
conductor sectors. It is home to some of the world’s largest automakers, including 
Toyota, Honda, and Nissan. In the Sendai region, manufacturing accounts for around one 
quarter of all production. The earthquake forced major international manufacturers, 
including Sony, Fujitsu, Toyota, and Hitachi, to suspend production at various plants 
throughout the region. Because many of the products produced in these plants were used 
to complete products at follow-on facilities, suspensions had cascading implications 
further down the supply chain (Nanto, Cooper, Donnelly, & Johnson, 2011).        
C. OPERATION TOMODACHI AND U.S.–JAPAN RELATIONS 
Operation Tomodachi (Japanese for friend) is the name given to the United 
States’ humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation in support of the Japanese 
mainland subsequent to the March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. The island 
nation hosts a large U.S. military presence, including bases in Misawa, Sasebo, Iwakuni, 
and Okinawa. Japan is home to the United States Navy’s 7th Fleet, the largest U.S. 
numbered fleet. The U.S. Navy has approximately 70 ships, 300 various types of aircraft, 
and approximately 40,000 sailors and Marines operating in the region on any given day, 
providing a ready and capable presence. Over the course of the crisis, the United States 
and Japanese governments engaged in far-reaching cooperation, providing relief and aid 
to affected areas of northeast Japan ( Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet [C7F], 2012).  
Each disaster is unique, and the response structure is often tailored to the 
attributes of a particular disaster. In Japan, host nation infrastructure, economic 
development, extensive U.S. military regional presence, culture, and the unique U.S.–
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Japan political relationship all influenced the structure of the HADR effort. Throughout 
the effort, the U.S. played a supporting role to the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF).  
The modern U.S. and Japanese military cooperative arrangement was established 
in 1951 with the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST), whose heart resides in the 
collaborative work undertaken by the U.S. military and the JSDF.  The joint response to 
the crisis highlighted the deep and far-reaching nature of the relationship and became a 
cornerstone of engagement between U.S. and Japanese military forces (Zielonka, 2011). 
The U.S. Department of State (DoS) repeatedly emphasized that Operation 
Tomodachi was a reflection of the enduring nature of the U.S.–Japan Alliance. In 
remarks made at the University of Tokyo in October 2011, Deputy Secretary of State 
William Burns states: 
the U.S.–Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our engagement in the Asia-
Pacific region . . . the United States is committed to the security of Japan 
and to strengthening peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region . . . the 
success of what we called Operation Tomodachi provided a powerful 
demonstration of what we can accomplish together. (p. 1) 
A strong and prosperous Japan is a key cornerstone of U.S. regional policy 
initiatives, and U.S.–Japanese mutual cooperation attempts to balance other destabilizing 
regional forces. Operation Tomodachi provided a clear and visible demonstration of this 
policy and the United States’ commitment to its partnership with the Asia-Pacific nation.   
Over the course of the operation, 16 U.S. naval ships and eight Military Sealift 
ships provided assistance and disaster relief efforts in and around the affected coastal 
areas of Japan.  Military Sealift ships were engaged in relief supply transfer to responding 
U.S. naval ships. While U.S. naval ships engaged in a range of operations (e.g., search 
and rescue [sar], relief supply delivery ashore, JSDF and U.S. Troop movement, and 
aircraft refueling operations), units from all U.S. Services assisted with a multitude of 
capabilities ranging from medical, communications, relief supply, and civil engineering.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
We collected data from U.S. naval specific internet news sources, including C7F 
news archives and other web resource forums. Due to the extensive coverage of 
Operation Tomodachi, these resources proved largely sufficient in garnering the data 
required. In addition, participating personnel at various commands were also contacted 
and provided data obtained, by their command, during the course of Operation 
Tomodachi.  
Data collected pertained to specific vessels that participated in Operation 
Tomodachi, including specific arrival and departure dates or dwell time, their time en 
route to the affected area, and the platform types and characteristics. This data was then 
catalogued into four primary tables broken down by platform capability, grading criteria, 
mission area capability, and the actual USN/MSC vessel response time line. By 
employing the same methodology as Greenfield and Ingram (2011), we place the U.S. 
naval response to Operation Tomodachi within the same framework as the responses to 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, and the 2010 Haitian earthquake 
analyzed by Greenfield and Ingram.         
1. Disaster Traits 
Japan’s 2011 9.0-magnitude Tohoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami occurred 
near the northeast coast of Honshu (USGS, 2011). The U.S. Navy typically performs a 
larger role in responding to disasters occurring within coastal regions (Greenfield & 
Ingram, 2011). Since the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami bears many of the same traits 
as the disasters analyzed by Greenfield and Ingram (2011), it is applicable to include this 
response as part of that framework. 
2. U.S. Naval HADR Response 
This project provides a look strictly at which U.S. naval vessels were sent and 
does not attempt to ascertain why a particular vessel was sent. The data utilized to format 
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the response table includes vessel type, arrival time, and duration of the vessel’s HADR 
mission. Data was compiled from C7F official historical news archives and, as a 
secondary source, web news forums. Due to the extensive coverage of Operation 
Tomodachi, these sources proved sufficient to establish an accurate response time line. 
3. USN and MSC Platform Capabilities 
We utilize the platform capabilities of particular classes as they pertain to specific 
HADR mission areas, defined by Greenfield and Ingram (2011). These capabilities were 
used as input into specific HADR mission area capability and cumulative capability 
indexes to establish a broad view of the U.S. naval response capability throughout 
Operation Tomodachi.   
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IV. EMPIRICAL DATA 
This chapter outlines the broad results of the devastation caused by the March 
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami and specific attributes of the disaster. It also 
defines the overall mission of Operation Tomodachi and the construct of the U.S. naval 
and MSC vessels responding in support of that operation. Additionally, it provides the 
response time line of these assisting vessels.    
A. JAPANESE DISASTER TRAITS 
The Japanese humanitarian crisis was the result of a 9.0-magnitude earthquake off 
the northeast coast of Honshu, Japan. The majority of the casualties occurred in and 
around Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima as the result of a subsequent tsunami with a 
maximum run-up height of approximately 125 ft. The tsunami also resulted in a nuclear 
reactor meltdown and crisis at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power plant (USGS, 2011). 
The 2011 Tohoku earthquake was the largest earthquake to strike Japan in 
recorded history. The largest earthquake prior was an 8.6-magnitude quake occurring in 
1933. The area remains a hotbed of earthquake activity, and the March 2011 quake did 
not raise or lower the probability of future quakes in the region (USGS, 2011). 
The overall effects of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Effects of Japanese Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, 2011 
(From Vervaeck & Daniell, 2011) 
Deaths > 14,000 
injured > 5,300 
Missing > 13,000 
Displaced > 136,000 
Buildings Destroyed > 95,300 




B. U. S. NAVY HADR RESPONSE 
The U.S. response to the resulting humanitarian crisis subsequent to Japan’s 
March 2011 earthquake was termed Operation Tomodachi. The U.S. naval response 
consisted of 16 warships, eight MSC vessels, and various aircraft and lasted 
approximately 30 days.  
1. Force Construct 
The ships involved in this response were primarily attached to the Reagan Carrier 
Strike Group, Essex Amphibious Ready Group, and Destroyer Squadron 15. The U.S 
naval platforms involved included one Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier, one Wasp Class 
Amphibious Assault Ship, one Blue Ridge Class Command Ship, one Harpers Ferry 
Dock Landing Ship, two Whidbey Island Dock Landing Ships, several Guided Missile 
Cruisers, and several Flight I and II Guided Missile Destroyers. 
 Military Sealift vessels include three Lewis and Clark Class Replenishment 
Ships, two Henry Kaiser Class Oilers, one Supply Class Fast Combat Support Ship, one 
salvage vessel, and one high-speed vessel.  
2. USN and MSC Vessel Response Time Line 
 Table 3 displays the response time line of the USN and MSC vessels supporting 
Operation Tomodachi. The table consists of the actual vessels responding to the disaster 
and their arrival and departure dates or dwell time. Its starting point is the day of the 
disaster.  
A cell shaded light gray indicates that the vessel was ordered to respond, 
preparing for underway, or en route to the affected area on that particular day. Any cell 
shaded dark gray indicates that the vessel was on station assisting with relief efforts. 
Cells shaded black indicate that the vessel was released from HADR tasking and no 
longer supporting the operation.  
An N has been placed in the cells applicable to USS George Washington. The 
vessel was required to get underway because it was undergoing shipyard maintenance 
availability and was unable to remain in the yard due to radiologic hazards associated 
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with the nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daichi power plant. The George 
Washington did not significantly participate in the operation. Operation Tomodachi 
concluded on or around April 9, 2011, the date the last vessels terminated relief 
operations.  
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Table 3.   Time Line of Operation Tomodachi Response (From C7F, 2011; Japan Bases, 2011; Baxter, 2011;  
Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Type Name Platform 11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19      20      21      22      23      24      25      26      27      28      29      30      31      1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10      11     
USS CHANCELLORSVILLE CG U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS COWPENS CG U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS SHILOH CG U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
USS PREBLE DDG U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS MUSTIN DDG U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS MCCAMBLE DDG X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS JOHN MCCAIN DDG U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS CURTIS WILBUR DDG U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS FITZGERALD DDG U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS ESSEX LHD U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS GERMANTOWN LSD U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USS HARPERS PERRY LSD U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS TORTUGA LSD U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS BLUE RIDGE LCC U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS RICHARD E BYRD T‐AKE X X X X X X O
USNS CARL BRASHEAR T‐AKE U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS MATTHEW PERRY T‐AKE U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS PECOS T‐AO X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS RAPPAHANNOACK T‐AO X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS BRIDGE T‐AOE U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O
USNS SAFEGUARD T‐ARS U U U U U U U U U U X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O




C. SPECIFIC PLATFORM HADR MISSION CAPABILITY 
This project applied the maritime platform capability classifications outlined by 
Greenfield and Ingram (2011) to the specific USN and MSC vessels responding as part of 
Operation Tomodachi. In accordance with this methodology, we evaluated vessel 
capability was evaluated using an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2 and assigned a 
symbol to each value.  
1. Capability Classification 
Table 4 defines the ordinal scale used to evaluate vessel capabilities.  
Table 4.   Capability Classification (From Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
Empty Circle 0 The vessel has little no capability to conduct the specified mission
Half Filled Circle 1 The vessel has some capability to conduct the specified mission
Filled Circle 2 The vessel is very capable in conducting the specified mission  
 
These capabilities feed into Table 5, which outlines the specific Mission Capability 
Parameter Definitions established by Greenfield and Ingram (2011). These mission areas 
are specifically related to HADR operations and do not reflect the overall combat 
capability of a particular platform. Although a vessel’s combat capability plays a certain 
role in aiding HADR mission effectiveness, it is not the sole determinant of a ship’s 
capability in the HADR mission arena.    
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Table 5.   Mission Capability Parameter Definitions (From Greenfield 
& Ingram, 2011) 
0 No embarked helo, unable to support helicopter operations
1 Single helo embarked, able to support a majority of helo platforms
2 Multiple helos embarked, able to sustain multiple flight operations simultaneously
0 No ability to support landing craft
1 Some ability to support landing craft
2 Landing craft embarked, able to load / off load cargo and store amphibious vehicles
0 No embarked helo, unable to efficiently conduct SAR missions
1 Single embarked helo with communication equipment and night vision




Roll On Roll Off 
Fuel
Self Sufficient
0 No ability to support personnel transfer, slow speed vessel with deep draft
1 Ability to support personnel transfer for 15+ personnel
2 High speed, shallow draft vessel with ability to transport 30+ personnel per voyage
0 no ability to produce freshwater beyond shipboard usage
1 Ability to produce and transfer >2,000 gallons per day beyond shipboard usage
2 Able to produce and transfer > 5,000 gpd beyond shipboard usage
0 Low crew number to support HADR mission (< 50 personnel)
1 Medium size crew which can support HADR mission (51 - 200 personnel)
2 Large crew with ability to support HADR mission (> 200 personnel)
0 Little to no excess berthing or facilities (< 30 racks)
1 some excess berthing and facilities (31-50 racks)
2 large number of excess berthing and facilities (> 50)
0 No ability to conduct impatient medical treatments, no Medical officer embarked
1 Some medical support onboard, ability to support minor medical procedures
2 Medical officer embarked, ability to perform surgeries and hold several patients
0 0-18 knots max speed
1 19-24 knots max speed
2 25 + knots max speed
0 no ability to conduct hydrographic surveys
1 some ability to conduct hydrographic surveys, soundings and chart building
2 Able to conduct hydrographic surveying, soundings and chart development
0 No ability to conduct salvage operations
1 some ability for lift and salvage operations in shallow waters
2 heavy lift and deep water salvage capable
0 No ability to conduct towing operations
1 Ability to conduct emergency towing operations
2 Designed to conduct push, pull, or alongside towing operations
Medical support
0 No ability to store good beyond current ship use























































 Capability classifications were the basis for developing the full assessment of a 
platform’s HADR mission capability. We applied the same specific capability 
parameters, assigned to particular USN and MSC vessel classes, as established by 
Greenfield and Ingram (2011) to enable scoring of overall maritime vessel mission 
capability during Operation Tomodachi. The capability comparisons of USN and MSC 
vessel platforms are listed in Tables 6 and 7.   
Table 6.   USN Platform and Capability Comparison (From Greenfield 






































CVN (Nimitz) 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
CVN (Enterprise) 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
LHD 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0
LHA 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0
LCC 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LPD (San Antonio) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LPD (Austin) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LSD (Harpers Ferry) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
LSD (Whidby Island) 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
CG 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
DDG (FLT I & II) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
DDG (FLT IIA) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
Frigates 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1
LCS (Freedom) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
LCS (Independence) 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
PC 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1



































































































































Table 7.   MSC Platform and Capability Comparison (From Greenfield 






































T-AOE 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
T-AO 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T-AE 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T-AKE 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T-ARS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
T-ATF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
T-AH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
LCC 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
AS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
T-AGOS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
T-AGS (Survey) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
T-AGS (Nav) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T-AGM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T-ARC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
LMSR 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
MPS 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
MPF Container 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T-AOT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T-AK (USAF) 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T-AK (USA) 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T-AVB 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
OPDS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Break-Bulk 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HSV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
LMSR 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Common Use Tanker 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dry Cargo 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fast Sealift Ship 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
RO/RO ships 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Crane Ships 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lighterage-aboard ships 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OPDT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Break-Bulk Ships 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

















































































































































These tables outline an easily comprehendible comparison of the capabilities and 
limitations of particular vessel classes available to the U.S. Navy in responding to 
humanitarian crises. The most capable USN vessels are the amphibious ships due to their 
unique design for amphibious surface assault with embarked Marine units, leading to 
high capability in the HADR mission areas of aircraft support, landing craft support, and 
berthing. In addition, large-deck amphibious vessels also have high medical support 
capability due to their onboard treatment facilities and embarked medical detachments. 
Aircraft carriers are also comparable with amphibious vessel capability with the 
exception of landing craft support (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011).   
 MSC vessels are highly capable in the area of cargo, fuel, and freshwater storage 
capacity but are primarily designed around transferring these stores from vessel to vessel 
vice vessel to shore. This limits their overall effectiveness in the HADR arena. In 
addition, MSC vessels frequently have small crew sizes and lack embarked helicopter 
units, thus limiting them in the areas of aircraft support and SAR. They are, however, 
essential in getting large amounts of supplies to the affected area for further transport via 
alternative means (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). 
 The capability parameters of the vessels are utilized in the Analysis chapter to 
establish a scoring of on-scene mission capability relative to the disaster response time 
line. The parameters do not indicate whether one vessel is a certain percent more capable 
than another or attempt to identify an optimal response level. Rather, it utilizes the three 
qualitative categories, defined in Table 3, along with the number of ships on station, to 
establish a broad view of USN and MSC vessel response capability as Operation 
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V. ANALYSIS 
 This chapter analyzes the particulars of the USN and MSC vessel response time 
line depicted in Table 3. It also provides and analyzes mission capability achieved as part 
of the response, utilizing the framework established in the previous chapter. In addition, it 
compares and contrasts the USN response time line and capabilities during Operation 
Tomodachi with the three previous responses (the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2005 
Hurricane Katrina, and the 2010 Haitian earthquake) analyzed by Greenfield and Ingram 
(2011).  
A. RESPONSE TIMELINE ANALYSIS 
Figure 3 displays the number of vessels on station by day beginning with the day 
of the disaster itself. Day 1 corresponds to March 11, 2011, the day of the Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami. This graphic is taken directly from the USN and MSC response 
time line depicted in Table 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Vessels on Station by Days After the Disaster 
 The most striking feature of Figure 3 is the rapid response rate of the vessels 
assigned to respond as part of Operation Tomodachi. On the first day of the disaster, one 
ship, USS McCampbell (DDG 85), was already on scene since it was operating in the 
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vicinity of the disaster zone. By Day 4, 12 vessels, including all elements of the Reagan 
Carrier Strike Group, were on station assisting relief efforts. The Essex Amphibious 
Ready Group arrived on Day 8, bringing the total number of vessels on station to 20. The 
number of vessels on station peaked at 22 vessels on Day 19. By Day 25, the majority of 
relief operations had concluded and the Reagan Carrier Strike Group departed for follow-
on tasking. Operation Tomodachi ended 30 days after the disaster, after which elements 
of the Essex Amphibious Ready Group departed the affected region.  
 In addition, the main elements of the Essex Amphibious Ready Group—in 
particular, USS Essex (LHD 2), USS Germantown (LSD 42), and USS Harpers Ferry 
(LSD 49)—took approximately eight days to arrive on station because of their relative 
distance from the disaster region and the time needed to load relief supplies. The Essex 
Amphibious Ready Group’s remaining element, USS Tortuga (LSD 46), began assistance 
efforts approximately three days prior, on Day 5, since the vessel was in Sasebo and 
closer to the affected region.           
We noted several factors that contributed to the rapid naval response and force 
positioning during Operation Tomodachi. These factors include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, the U.S. 7th Fleet commander’s ordering of a posturing of forces immediately 
after the disaster struck the Tohoku region; no serious damage to 7th Fleet assets in the 
region, including infrastructure at naval base Yokosuka; Reagan Carrier Strike Group 
elements within minimal steaming distance from the affected region; a higher state of 
required logistical readiness for deployed and forward-deployed vessels within the 7th 
Fleet; and a significant number of USN and MSC ships already operating in the region.   
B. COMPOSITE MISSION CAPABILITY 
 Table 8 provides the mission composite capability during Operation Tomodachi. 
The table begins on Day 1 of the disaster and corresponds directly to the start of 
Operation Tomodachi. Table 8 was formulated utilizing the various USN and MSC 
platform HADR capabilities identified in Tables 6 and 7 in the previous chapter.  In 
accordance with the capability classifications outlined in Table 4, a filled circle assigned 
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the platform a score of 2 for a particular mission area, a half-filled circle assigned it a 
score of 1, and an empty circle assigned a score of zero. The results for each platform 
were combined utilizing the capability levels identified in Tables 6 and 7 along with the 
vessel response time line, providing a cumulative mission capability index for each day 
of the response. The higher the composite score, the greater the response capacity was for 
that particular timeperiod (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). 
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Table 8.   Mission Composite Capability Time Line: Operation Tomodachi (From Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19      20      21      22      23      24      25      26      27      28      29      30      31      1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10      11      12      13     
1 2 7 10 13 13 13 21 21 21 21 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 2 2 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 0 0 0
1 1 5 8 10 10 10 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0
0 2 5 5 8 8 8 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
0 2 5 5 8 8 8 13 13 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0
0 2 5 5 6 6 6 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 3 3 5 5 5 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 3 3 5 5 5 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 0
1 1 5 8 11 11 11 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 2 8 11 12 12 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 2 3 3 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 2 3 3 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 0





















 Table 8 indicates that cumulative capability peaked on Day 19 at 168 when all 
responding vessels were on station. The majority of mission capability was achieved by 
Day 8, when capability reached 150. This was due to the arrival of the remaining Essex 
Amphibious Ready Group and its significantly greater capacity for HADR response 
relative to other responding vessels, including the Carrier Strike Group. For instance, the 
relative capability increased by approximately 50 on Day 3 when the Reagan Carrier 
Strike Group arrived on station, but it increased by 87 as members of the Essex 
Amphibious Ready Group arrived.  
 The response effort was initially executed utilizing a Carrier Strike Group and 
Expeditionary Strike Group operating model. As identified by Greenfield and Ingram 
(2011), the same model was utilized by the U.S. Navy in responding to the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami. Although the Indian Ocean tsunami covered a wide area, the U.S. Navy 
concentrated most of its response effort in the hardest hit area of western Indonesia, and it 
was a 7th Fleet–centered operational response. On or around March 15, 2011, the fourth 
day into the response effort, the naval response effort transitioned into the Joint Task 
Force model (C7F, 2011).  
C. DISASTER RESPONSE COMPARISON 
 Figure 4 displays the cumulative mission composite capability of Operation 
Tomodachi in relation to the cumulative mission composite capability of the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, and the 2010 Haitian earthquake calculated by 






Figure 4.   Cumulative Mission Capability Comparison  
(From Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
 In contrast to the other disasters, peak response efforts in Japan occurred far more 
rapidly and tapered off much more quickly than the other three disasters depicted in the 
table. In Operation Tomodachi, peak response levels began at Day 8, at least five days 
prior to the peak response period of Hurricane Katrina and four days prior to the peak 
response levels of the 2010 Haitian earthquake.  
In addition, beginning at Day 26, Operation Tomodachi’s response effort declined 
dramatically, and it officially ended at Day 31. It experienced the most rapid termination 
of any of the disasters depicted, although several days before Operation Tomodachi’s 
termination, the response effort appears to resemble that of Hurricane Katrina, which 
terminated around Day 37. Around Day 23, the response effort to Hurricane Katrina 
experienced a significant drop in mission capability. This was due to the evacuation of 
naval vessels from the disaster area in preparation for Hurricane Rita, which was poised 
to strike the Gulf Coast, and not due to an intended reduction in the level of operations 
(Greenfield & Ingram, 2011).  
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 Operation Tomodachi was truncated primarily by the desire of the United States 
government to assist the Japanese government in its time of need and avoid the 
impression that the U.S. military was maintaining a permanent presence in the affected 
area.  In contrast, Hurricane Katrina’s response was quickly terminated due to the 
presence of DoS and non-government-organization (NGO) actors that assumed the 
responsibilities initially shouldered by the military (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011).    
 28
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RAPIDITY OF INITIAL RESPONSE 
One of the remarkable aspects of Operation Tomodachi was the speed of initial 
response by U.S naval vessels. We noted several contributing factors that enabled a faster 
initial response during Operation Tomodachi than in the three disasters analyzed by 
Greenfield and Ingram (2011). These factors include the close proximity of U.S. naval 
and MSC vessels to the affected region, the U.S. 7th Fleet’s ordering force pre-
positioning the day of the disaster, no major damage to naval base infrastructure in the 
region, the higher level of logistical readiness maintained by forward-deployed U.S. 
naval forces, and the mutually positive relationship existing between the U.S. and 
Japanese governments.  
Each of these factors contributed to the rapidity of the initial response to a greater 
or lesser degree. We did not determine the actual weight that each of these had because 
this would involve data collection and analysis outside the scope of this project. It is our 
intention to simply bring these observations to light in order to benefit operational 
planners and future decision-makers. 
B. UNIQUE AND SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 The extent of Japanese earthquake and tsunami preparedness played a crucial role 
in mitigating infrastructure damage and death toll in the affected regions of northern 
Japan. Although it is impossible to plan for every scenario, a major lesson of the March 
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami is that well-planned disaster mitigation initiatives 
do work and can save a considerable number of lives. This is evidenced in Table 1, by  
the very small percentage of missing and dead, as a part of total daytime population, in 
the affected prefectures.  
  We observed that online social message forums, such as Facebook, played an 
increasing role in informing the general populace about the extent of damage to affected 
regions and the ongoing efforts by first responders, including the U.S. Navy. U.S. 7th 
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Fleet regularly updated its Facebook page with unclassified releasable response 
information normally contained in its public affairs webpage. This adds an additional 
dimension to public communication not without its own challenges. For instance, 
although social media  can provide citizens with real-time information regarding the 
disaster, it can also complicate matters in the event of an inadvertent release of sensitive 
information. 
 In addition, language barriers existing between responders and the indigenous 
population inhibited the determination of required relief supplies to at least some degree. 
This problem is not unique to Operation Tomodachi and will be encountered during 
almost any HADR operation conducted by the U.S. military outside North America. 
Operational planners should consider more widespread use of easy-to-implement items, 
such as laminated cards, that responders can utilize to determine the immediate needs of 
the local civilian population to speed-up delivery of needed materials.  
 The 2011 Japanese humanitarian crisis is unique in that it is a compilation of at 
least three individual and interrelated disasters. The first is the earthquake itself, the 
second is the subsequent tsunami, and the third is the fallout from the Fukushima nuclear 
reactor meltdown. Due to the magnitude of the crisis, this project only begins to scratch 
the surface regarding the overall response effort and scope. Further research, by 
subsequent project teams, is definitely warranted and will only serve to benefit planners 
and decision-makers, enabling a more structured and capable mitigation/response 






C. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Table 9 contains a list of future research recommendations based on the limits to 
our research and areas identified during the data collection and analysis process that 
warrant further study. 
Table 9.   Future Research Recommendations 
Conduct an in-depth analysis of the Fukushima nuclear disaster that occurred as a result 
of the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. 
More in-depth analysis of the role the other uniformed services played during Operation 
Tomodachi. 
Identify and thoroughly analyze the specific HADR capabilities of vulnerable countries 
within the Rim of Fire. 
Analyze the feasibility of developing an HADR response package that can be tailored to 
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